




A. Space Activities and the Reality
of Earth Contamination
Perhaps the most expensive and intricate measures in preventive medi-
cine were conducted prior to, during, and after the United States Apollo I I
mission to the lunar surface. Official concern, both domestic and in-
ternational, over what has been termed back contamination1 from re-entry
vehicles, astronauts, associated equipment and non-crew personnel was not
a last-minute issue of scientific interest or concern over a possible reaction
by an aroused international public regarding the possibility of "Earth in-
vasion" by alien micro-organisms from the lunar surface. 2 The official
concern, although not completely revealed to the public, was timely and, in
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1No specific instrument, pronouncement, or decree ordered the use of "back con-
tamination" as official terminology and as the designation for the Interagency Committee on
Back Contamination ultimately established to consider the problem. In contradistinction to
"outbound contamination," interested members of the scientific community have used "in-
bound contamination" interchangeably with "back contamination." Contamination means to
.*... infect by contact or association ... [and] implies intrusion of or contact with an outside
source as the cause...." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1965), under
contaminate, p. 180. Within the context of quarantine regulations issued by NASA, 34 Fed.
Reg. 11975, No. 135 (July 16, 1969), back contamination relates to the object of the
regulations, i.e., those who, or that which, is "extraterrestrially exposed." The latter is defined
in the regulations as ". . . the state or condition of any person, property, animal or other form
of life or matter whatever, who or which has: (I) touched directly or come within the
atmospheric envelope of any other celestial body; or (2) touched directly or been in close
proximity to (or been exposed indirectly to) any person, property, animal or other form of life
or matter who or which has been extraterrestrially exposed by virtue of subparagraph (1) of
this paragraph."
2 Because of the proximity of the Apollo 10 Lunar Excursion Module to the lunar surface
(9.5 mile "flyby" in an essentially non-existent lunar atmosphere), the Apollo 10 command
module was subjected to limited bio-analyses and quarantine procedures. In this respect, see
NASA-Medical Requirements, Apollo Mission F (10), Manned Spacecraft Center (April
1969).
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itself, precipitated partially adequate and timely preparations through the
coordinated efforts of several government agencies and elements of pri-
vate industry.
Certain precautions have been taken over the years to sterilize space
hardware designed to leave Earth's atmosphere, to enter alien atmo-
spheres; or to impact upon the surfaces of other celestial bodies. The
principal purpose was, and is, to minimize the probability of contaminating
outer space and other planets with Earth organisms,3 not only to avoid
frustration of scientific investigations aimed at acquiring knowledge about
life-forms and life-related molecules on other planets, but also to avoid the
possibility of identifying, in a quarantine situation, organisms indigenous to
Earth as space alien. 4
With the imminence of manned missions and recoverable unmanned
missions, the concern focused principally on the prevention of possible
Earth contamination.5 Over a period of time, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration has been developing a back contamination program
designed principally for the Apollo manned missions and consisting of very
complex equipment and extensively intricate operational procedures. The
program is far in advance of generally practiced microbiological laboratory
techniques and offers unprecedented laboratory capabilities.
Many factors have interacted to require the United States to be the first
nation to promulgate and effectively implement rules regarding the safe-
guarding of Earth's ecosystem from extraterrestrial contaminants. Principal.
among the influential factors was President John F. Kennedy's com-
mitment of the United States to land a man on the moon by 1970.6 The
fulfilling of this commitment necessitated the formulation of back con-
3Art. IX of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities and Use of Outer Space
Including The Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2222/(XXI) 25 Jan.
1967; TIAS No. 6347 (27 Jan. 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the Outer Space Treaty)
provides for the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies in such a way "as to
avoid their harmful contamination" (emphasis added). The Outer Space Treaty recognizes, by
use of the word "harmful," that not only is 100% sterilization of spacecraft, equipment,
delivery vehicles and personnel impossible, but also that within certain contexts the word
"contamination" is legitimately argumentative.4Effective control of "outbound contamination" is an integral facet of back contamination
quarantine procedures since, among other factors, the duration of quarantine may depend
upon the facility with which organisms are identified as indigenous to Earth and not extra-
terrestrially derived.
5As indicated in n. 3, supra, "contamination" is subjective in nature. Within the frame-
work of space activities, and specifically back contamination of Earth's ecosystem, the word is
intended to describe, essentially, an inclusive, but passive, situation, i.e., contact with extra-
terrestrial matter without necessarily involving infection or tainting of Earth's ecosystem. As
will be seen in subsequent discussions of quarantine authority, the reason for such a passive
definition is the large element of ignorance regarding the physical and potential etiologic
properties of extraterrestrial matter.6Speech delivered at Rice University, Houston, Texas, on September 12, 1962.
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tamination standards and quarantine procedures by July 1969.
To the extent that unmanned recoverable satellites may present possi-
bilities of back contamination - as well as outbound contamination - it may
well be said that the U.S.S.R. had the first opportunity to set precedence
for regulating the threat of contamination of Earth's ecosystem by virtue of
having launched the world's first artificial satellite. 7 However, because of
the absence of effective reporting by the Soviets, it is difficult, at best, to
determine whether they were mindful, at that time, of back contamination
control -other than perhaps within a strictly scientific framework as op-
posed to public health considerations. The fact that the United States was
put in the position of promulgating back contamination regulations of the
first instance does not necessarily imply that those regulations are prece-
dents for subsequent manned and unmanned flights conducted by other
countries. Indeed, every indication is that, effectively, they are constrained
to domestic jurisdiction with only questionable efficacy as they relate to
pertinent activities in international waters, international airspace, and per-
haps even the res communis of outer space and other celestial bodies as
envisioned by the United Nations. Functionally, however, operational ap-
plication of the regulations has a direct effect on the rights of other nations
in the preservation of their domestic and international health and security.
For the purpose of providing assistance to NASA in formulating a
program to prevent adverse contamination of Earth's biosphere by lunar
matter returned from manned explorations, the Interagency Committee on
Back Contamination (ICBC) was established in 1967.8 In the preamble to
the Interagency Agreement, it is observed that
[i]n developing the Apollo Lunar Program, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration recognizes that it must draw upon the specialized
knowledge and experience of certain other agencies [presumably restricted to
Federal agencies or instruments of the Federal Government] in order to
protect the public's health, agriculture, and other living resources against the
possibility of contamination resulting from returning lunar astronauts or lunar
exposed material.... (Emphasis and insert added.)
The principal agencies represented on the ICBC are NASA, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
the Department of the Interior, and the National Academy of Sciences.
The primary mission of the ICBC was, and continues to be, the provision
of assistance to NASA in developing a lunar-Earth contamination pre-
7Sputnik I was launched October 4, 1957, and was quickly followed on November 3 of
the same year, by Sputnik II.
"The Interagency Agreement, establishing the Interagency Committee on Back Con-
tamination, came into effect August 24, 1967. The Committee is charged with the protection
of Earth's biosphere from lunar sources of contamination.
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ventive system. Specifically, the ICBC Interagency Agreement provides
for the authority to evaluate and approve procedures to prevent back
contamination. 9 Toward accomplishing this objective, the ICBC approved
the requirements for manned lunar missions as set forth in the cited NASA
Management Issuances and detailed Manned Spacecraft Center Docu-
ments MSC 00001-00004.
From the pertinent NASA policy directives and deliberations of the
ICBC evolved the Apollo Back Contamination Program which can be
divided, very generally, into three phases: (1) procedures to be followed by
the crew "while in flight to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the return of
lunar surface contaminants in the command module;"' 1 (2) procedures
involving the spacecraft recovery and isolated transport of the crew, lunar
samples, and spacecraft and associated mission equipment to the site of
protracted confinement (quarantine); (3) procedures accompanying quaran-
tine operations and initial lunar sample analyses at the Lunar Receiving
Laboratory. Also arising from NASA policy directives and ICBC deliber-
ations was the "last-minute" promulgation of quarantine regulations, as to
the authority for which NASA must have entertained serious doubts even
during the drafting stages."
B. Authority to Promulgate Quarantine Regulations
and Enforce the Back Contamination Program
The very nature of quarantine has significant impact upon the integrity
9According to Item 5.b. of the ICBC Agreement, 'Ithe Administrator of NASA, or
NASA's designated representative, shall consult with the head or designated representative of
each other interested agency prior to NASA's taking of any of the following actions, unless
such action is in accordance with the unanimous recommendation of the regulatory agency
and National Academy of Sciences members of the Interagency Committee on Back Con-
tamination .. " The actions specified cover (1) changing of procedures regarding isolation
and containment of astronauts and lunar samples; (2) changes in procedures, standards, etc.,
of containment testing at the LRL; (3) changing of procedures, standards, etc., for astronaut
testing and lunar-exposed material; and (4) the release of astronauts and lunar-exposed
materials.
t
°For a brief, but good, working description of the contamination control program see
Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., Press Kit for the Apollo II Lunar Landing Mission
181-191, Release No. 69-83K, released Sunday, July 6, 1969, by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. See, also, NASA-Report on the Status of the Apollo Back
Contamination Program, Manned Spacecraft Center (April 28, 1969).
"For an itemization of those documented indications that NASA and the ICBC had
serious reservations about the adequacy of existing legislative authority for NASA to promul-
gate quarantine regulations, see G. ROBINSON, CONTAMINATION OF EARTH'S ECOSYSTEM BY
EXTRATERRESTRIAL MATTER: UNITED STATES AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE AND ENFORCE
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS, DCL thesis submitted to McGill University, July 1970. This
interdisciplinary study records the scientific, legal, and administrative history of the first steps
taken by the United States to protect Earth from harmful extraterrestrial contaminants.
Further, the thesis provides an extensive analysis of the efficacy and applicability of the
quarantine regulations within the framework of existing international law.
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of certain provisions of the United States Constitution. For this reason, it
is essential that all quarantine authority be drafted with utmost care and
precision. Historically, this has been followed carefully. However, it ap-
pears that assurance of adequate legislative authority was not forthcoming
regarding promulgation of NASA's quarantine regulations. Put concisely,
the issue for evaluation at this point in the discussion is whether the
Administrator of NASA, acting alone or in conjunction with certain other
Government officials, has the authority to (1) apprehend, detain, examine,
decontaminate and quarantine individuals; and (2) seize, examine, decon-
taminate, condemn and destroy animals, or other forms of life or property,
if such individuals, animals or property should-through design or acci-
dent-be exposed to extraterrestrial matter obtained by, or involved in, a
NASA space flight.
The legislative history of the Space Act of 1958 indicates the intention
of the Congress to make NASA's authority for conducting research and
exploration of space rather broad, principally because the scope of "space
activities" was still in a highly speculative stage at the time of drafting. As
noted in their Report, the Congressional conferees observed that
[t]he use of the word 'activities' ... is intended to be broad in the area of
outer space because no one can predict with certainty what future require-
ments may be. ... [T]he term 'activities' should be construed broadly enough
to enable ... [NASA] to carry on a wide spectrum of activities which relate
to the successful use of outer space.12
In view of the rather unrestrained language and apparent underlying
intent of the Congress, it would appear that (1) extraterrestrial exposure or
contamination is a natural result of certain space activities; (2) that transfer
contamination of Earth's ecosystem logically may follow from such space
activities involving recoverable personnel and objects; and (3) that NASA
quite naturally has the statutory responsibility to protect Earth from ad-
verse extraterrestrial exposure. In essence, as well as theory, this sequence
of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the NASA Administrator has
authority to control not only NASA and Contractor personnel vis-a-vis
quarantine procedures, but he has authority to "regulate the conduct of
every person and interfere with all property subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" [and it has been shown, above, that such jurisdiction
may have direct extraterritorial applications and consequences], in conflict
with the right of liberty and the right to property prescribed by the Federal
Constitution. 13 As seen in the following discussions of the explicit and
12See House Report 2166, 85th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 17.
13 Tentative support for NASA authority to quarantine is the Congressional approval for
construction of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory. According to pertinent testimony at the
hearings, it was understood that, insofar as NASA personnel and contractor employees are
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detailed authorization by Congress for certain departments and agencies to
quarantine, the absence of NASA's authorizing legislation with respect to
promulgating quarantine regulations stands out in sharp contrast.
At first reflection, it appears that since the NASA Administrator has not
been provided with necessary and proper legislative authority to quaran-
tine, Congress has defaulted and Nasa quite rightly has filled this void with
its own regulations to protect Earth's ecosystem. In addition to the absence
of legal precedence and Constitutionality of this approach, NASA has not
stated, as a means of justifying promulgation of the quarantine regulations,
that the Congress has defaulted. Rather, it appears that the Congress was
kept functionally uninformed about the work of the ICBC and the difficulty
it was having in finding existing authority to quarantine. To the contrary,
NASA ultimately premised the regulations on what the ICBC determined
was adequate existing legislation. The adequacy of this legislation is exam-
ined, below.
NASA
Government Departments and agencies principally responsible for the
protection of the public's health, agriculture and other life forms con-
stituting a resource for man,' 4 pooled their respective statutory authorities
in order to provide substance to any regulations NASA might promulgate
to enforce the back contamination program. This was probably considered
essential since NASA, by itself, did not appear at the outset to have
adequate statutory authority to issue regulations sufficiently extensive in
scope to cover all activities envisioned for protection of Earth's ecosystem
from returning missions having come in contact with alien atmospheric
envelopes and/or celestial bodies.
The principal source of potential authority, of course, is the Space Act
of 1958, as amended (72 Stat. 426). Specifically, section 203(b)(1) pro-
vides, in part, that
[iun the performance of its functions the Administration is authorized ... to
make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing
the manner of its operations and the exercise of the powers vested in it by
law....
concerned who are intimately involved with a recoverable, extraterrestrially exposed mission,
the LRL was to be the facility for quarantined astronauts and other extraterrestrially-exposed
personnel and objects. Apparently, the Congress was not fully aware of the scope of the
regulations until the day they were published and became effective, i.e., the day of the Apollo
I I launching. See, therefore, Hearings of the House Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (on the NASA Authorization Act 1968), Part 2, pp. 398, 1340,
1342- 1346.14See Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Titles 7, 9, 42, 50 and Public Law 410,
wherein those Government agencies responsible for protecting the public's health, agriculture
and other living resources are identified clearly.
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At a glance, this broad sweep of authority may appear to provide NASA
with more than sufficient authority to quarantine material and personnel
exposed to extraterrestrial matter. However, since the act of quarantine
involves the detention and/or incarceration not only of Government em-
ployees and property, but of private individuals and property as well, it is
extremely difficult to interpret Congressional intent regarding section
203(b)(1) of the Act as giving NASA's Administrator carte-blanche au-
thority in this area without more specifically delineated constraints; espe-
cially since it involves the issue of deprivation of liberty and property
covered by the Federal Constitution. 15
Section 304(a) of the Act offers a possible alternative approach to
authorization of quarantine regulations by providing, in part, that
[tihe Administrator shall establish such security requirements, restrictions,
and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of the national security.
Because of the possibility that space contaminated material could interfere
severely with the human ecosystem, or adversely infect Earth's biosphere,
it is reasonable to consider the possibility as contrary to the interests of
national security and, therefore, a proper subject for the Administrator's
"security requirements, restrictions, and safeguards." However, the entire
section 304 deals with matters such as personnel investigations within the
framework of national loyalty, accessability of certain employees and pri-
vate individuals to restricted data, preservation of the integrity of such data
as it relates to the common defense and security, and acts of espionage in
general. 16 Subsection 304(c) provides for penalties applicable to the viola-
tion of security regulations and leaves little doubt as to the constraints on
the scope of the "interest of the national security."' 17 Subsections (d) and
15See, specifically, the 4th and 5th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Whenever Congress has legislated authority to quarantine, such authority has been the subject
of well-defined procedural constraints. See 42 U.S.C. 264, 266; 7 U.S.C. 150 dd, 160-161;
and 21 U.S.C. 11, et seq. Under the analogous general authority for all heads of departments
and agencies to issue regulations pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 301, no regulations have been issued
which could result in the confinement of individuals and the seizure and possible destruction
of property.16See, specifically, §§ 304(a) and (b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2455. Reference in these
subsections to arrangements for investigations of personnel by the Civil Service Commission
and referral to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for full field investigations of actual and
prospective employees suspected of "questionable loyalty" is fairly conclusive that the secu-
rity provisions of section 304 were not intended to include authority for the Administrator to
promulgate quarantine regulations.
17Sec. 304(c) provides that "[wihoever willfully shall violate, attempt to violate, or
conspire to violate any regulation or order promulgated by the Administrator ... for the
protection or security of any laboratory, station, base or other facility, or part thereof, or any
aircraft, missile, spacecraft, or similar vehicle, or part thereof, or other property or equipment
in the custody of the Administration, or any real or personal property or equipment in the
custody of any contractor... shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both." (Chp. 37, Title 18 U.S.C. 799).
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(e) provide for protection of officers and employees in the execution of
security regulations and permit the use of firearms for proper enforcement
of them. 18 Consequently, it appears that the proper conclusion is that the
act of incarcerating persons or property pursuant to back contamination
quarantine procedures does not derive its authority from section 304 of the
Space Act. This section is, essentially, authorization for passive prepara-
tion against, and defensive response to, acts which are initiated from
without NASA, and does not encompass positive acts properly initiated
pursuant to the general authority of the Space Act.
Aside from the obvious scientific justification to provide for quarantine
in the contamination control program, the United States has agreed by
Treaty to take necessary steps to protect Earth's biosphere from con-
tamination. Therefore, international commitment by formal agreement, as
well as practical necessity, compel the need for quarantine authority. Con-
sequently, a final possible alternative19 for authority of NASA to issue
quarantine regulations is Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. Article IX
provides that all States Parties to the Treaty shall conduct exploration of
outer space and celestial bodies, and shall make use of those resources, in
such a manner
18Sec. 304(e) of the Space Act, 42 U.S.C. 2456.1
"Emergency authority pursuant to the Administrator's oath of Office, prescribed in 5
U.S.C. 3331, is omitted as an alternative since it is too remote and the history of back
contamination consideration indicates ample planning time for the Governmental bodies
involved. Any emergency authority invoked undoubtedly would not issue from the Adminis-
trator's oath. A situation could occur, of course, where instantaneous quarantine by NASA
was required with a consequent attempt to invoke the theory of Presidential alter ego. See,
therefore, In re Neagle 135 U.S. I (1890), in which the court determined that a Federal
Government officer, who had killed an assailant of a Supreme Court Justice, in defense of the
Justice, should be released on a writ of habeas corpus from the custody of a California county
sheriff who had charged him with murder pursuant to California Law. The Court premised its
determination, in part, on the President's Constitutional authority to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed and that this authority extended, by oath of office, to the Head of an
Executive Department who authorizes the protection of Government officers performing their
official duties. The implication in the instant situation is that if the NASA Administrator may
be considered the President's alter ego, he may authorize in an emergency those steps
necessary to protect NASA personnel and Government property from the potentially adverse
effects of lunar contamination. This contention is defeated by the fact that (1) the Adminis-
trator is required, by oath of Office, to protect the Constitution, a principal provision of which
protects a person from deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law; and (2)
the Administrator of NASA is not the Head of an Executive Department. See, therefore, 5
U.S.C. 101, in which Executive Department is defined. NASA is not included. See also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the authority of the
President to ensure faithful execution of the laws is referred to and discussed at pp. 587,
610-612, 633, 646, 649 (fnt. 17), 660 and 661 (fnt. 3). Here, it was indicated that In re Neagle
may no longer be viable since the President was held not to have the authority, by himself, to
seize private steel mills in an emergency and in the interest of national defense. This view is
even more firm in back contamination situations where applicable quarantine regulations are
premised upon a carefully thought-out program and no emergency is not involved.
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as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the
environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial
matter and, where necessary shall adopt appropriate measures for this pur-
pose. (Emphasis added.)
The first point which tends to negate Article IX as a source of NASA
authority to promulgate quarantine regulations is the phrase "where neces-
sary." At present, the state of the art does not permit absolute knowledge
of the existence of alien life forms (let alone whether they are harmful to
Earth's biosphere) until they have been introduced into the ecosystem and
examined under laboratory conditions. The second, and perhaps most
limiting factor is that the Treaty cannot be considered self-executing and,
hence, adequate authority does not exist in that source for the Adminis-
trator to "adopt appropriate measures" for the purpose of safeguarding
Earth from extraterrestrial contamination. 20 Since regulatory implementa-
tion (i.e., quarantine regulations) would directly affect basic rights of citi-
zens in such a way as to deprive them of their liberty and property, the
intervening factor of appropriate legislative authorization by the Congress
appears absolutely necessary. This legislation, of course, does not exist.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
The United States Public Health Service Act (Public Law 410, 78th
Congress) provides authority for the Surgeon General2' to issue and en-
force regulations designed to prevent the introduction and spread of com-
municable diseases into, and throughout, the United States, its territories
and possessions. The authority provides, in pertinent part, that
(a) The Surgeon General ... is authorized to make and enforce such regu-
lations as ... are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or
20By its own terms, Article IX cannot be self-executing; e.g., the provision envisages that
the United States, as well as other States Parties to the Treaty, "... shall adopt appropriate
measures for this purpose" (emphasis added). In this respect, see Hackworth, V DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 490, pp. 198-199 (1943), wherein it is observed that, "[I]egislative
aid to give effect to treaties is often necessary ... where administrative machinery is required
in order to carry out such terms, and where penalties are to be imposed for treaty violation,
etc." Query: If the Outer Space Treaty is self-executing, is the violation of NASA's quaran-
tine regulations and attendant criminal provision in fact a violation of a Treaty criminal
provision? See, also, in Hackworth, Vol. V, § 488, pp. 177-185, Self-executing treaties. In the
view of Chief Justice John Marshall, a treaty is not self-executing if "the terms of the
[treaty] ... import a contract, [and] when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court." Foster and Elam v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 253 at 314 (1829). See also, Dembling and Arons, The Evolution
of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR. L. & COMM. 419 (1967), wherein no mention is made of
whether the Treaty is self-executing or not.21See 80 Stat. 1610, wherein responsibilities of the Public Health Service and the
Surgeon General were transferred to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant
to the 1966 Reorganization Plan No. 3.
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spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or
possessions....
(b) Regulations prescribed under this section shall not provide for the
apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals except for the
purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of such com-
municable diseases as may be specified ... in Executive orders of the Presi-
dent upon the recommendation of the National Advisory Health Council and
the Surgeon General.
22
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, regulations pre-
scribed under this section, insofar as they provide for the apprehension,
detention, examination, or conditional release of individuals, shall be appli-
cable only to individuals coming into a State or possession from a foreign
country or a possession.
(d) ... regulations prescribed under this section may provide for the appre-
hension and examination of any individual reasonably believed to be infected
with a communicable disease in a communicable stage.... Such regulations
may provide that if upon examination any such individual is found to be
infected, he may be detained for such time and in such manner as may be
reasonably necessary." (Emphasis and footnote added.) 23
First, the applicable Public Health Service regulations are limited in
scope to those situations involving the introduction and spread of commu-
nicable diseases throughout the U.S., its territories or possessions. One of
the critical factors in the back contamination program is that initial contact
of re-entry vehicles, limited by the present state of the art, is with Earth's
airspace and surface over and in international waters ("hard" landings by
the U.S.S.R. in domestic territory, notwithstanding). As discussed pre-
viously, United States jurisdiction for the international application of its
domestic quarantine regulations is, at best, questionable at this point. One
highly improbable exception may be the Public Health Service regulation
which premise is jurisdiction, in part, upon control of an area by the United
States as follows:
A person shall not import into any place under the control of the United
States, nor distribute after importation, any etiological agent.., unless ac-
companied by a permit issued by the Surgeon General. (Emphasis added.) 24
Although "control" is not defined, it may be argued that the splashdown
area in international waters is under the de facto control of the United
States for the period of recovery operations. However, this involves an
issue which would undoubtedly be unacceptable in most international legal
2The diseases which the President has so specified are listed in Executive Order 11070;
also 42 CFR, Parts 71 and 72.
2342 U.S.C. 264. For Public Health regulations dealing with the transportation of
etiologic agents as well as provisions for transporting etiologic agents, see 42 CFR, Chp. I,
PHS, Part 71, Foreign Quarantine; Subpart J, Importation of.Certain Things; Sec. 71.156;
and 42 CFR, Chp. 1, PHS; Part 72, Interstate Quarantine; Subpart C, Shipment of Certain
Things; Sec. 72.25, respectively.
2442 CFR, Chp. I, Part 71, Subpart J, Sec. 71.156(a).
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fora, depending upon the type,*location, and extent of interference caused
by the control. Further, the regulation requires a permit based upon knowl-
edge that an individual is carrying, or is contaminated with, an etiological
agent. In most recovery missions, if not all, this can be only post facto
knowledge. The same is true of the basic premise of these regulations, i.e.,
that the etiologic agent is a known communicable disease when, in fact, it
can be known only after laboratory examination to identify any extra-
terrestrial life form which might have been brought back from a space
mission.25
Subsection (c), above, is self-explanatory to the extent that a State and a
possession are well defined in international law and "foreign country" has
yet to be construed as covering outer space and nonterrestrial celestial
bodies. Subsection (d), above, would be applicable only to the extent that
experience or previous space missions have provided the knowledge that
equipment and/or personnel reasonably may be expected "to be infected
with a communicable disease in a communicable stage ... ." For these
reasons, it is submitted that necessary authority to quarantine in support of
the back contamination program does not rest with the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
The Departmeht ofAgriculture
Statutory provisions exist which authorize the Secretary of Agriculture
to quarantine any "article of any character whatsoever" capable of carry-
ing any dangerous plant disease or insect infestation, but only if he has
reason to believe that the article is (not may be) infested or infected, or that
the quarantine is necessary to prevent the spread of a dangerous disease or
infestation.2 6
The Secretary of Agriculture also has authority to quarantine any article
or animal, but no person, in order to prevent the introduction or dis-
semination of a contagious, infectious or communicable disease of ani-
mals. 27 Once more, the condition precedent to the Secretary of Agricul-
ture's exercise of quarantine authority, including exercise of that authority
in support of NASA's back contamination program, appears to be that first
2At most, under these circumstances a determination can be made on the basis of
suspicion-a ground which very likely would be insufficient for the determination. Several
state courts have distinguished between probable cause for reasonable belief that a person has
been exposed to a contagious or infectious disease (which a state's statute requires for
quarantine) and suspicion of exposure. The courts have held that suspicion is not enough; see
People v. Robertson, 134 N.E. at 815 (I11. 1922); Ex parte Shepard 195 Pac. 1077 (Calif.
1921); and Wragg v. Griffin, 170 N.W. 400 (Iowa 1919).
26See 7 U.S.C. 150 dd, and 160-161.27See 21 U.S.C. 111-134h.
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he must make a determination that a contagious, infectious, or commu-
nicable disease exists.
From the foregoing discussions it is seen that NASA, almost solely on a
pro forma basis as the ICBC representative responsible for the space
mission, has promulgated the quarantine regulations, even though the ques-
tion remained extant as to which Department or agency had the necessary
legislative authority. An attempt was made, within the regulations them-
selves, to rely on every source of legislation that, collectively, might pro-
vide adequate authority for the regulatory action. However, by evaluating
the legislation relied on, it was seen that neither collectively nor severally
is there proper and sufficient legislation-or other emergency
sources-necessary to provide adequate authority for the regulations.
C. Legislative Authority for the Quarantine of
Extraterrestrially-Exposed Matter -
Constitutional Barriers?
Since the Supreme Court consistently has upheld the authority of a State
to make reasonable quarantine regulations under the State's exercise of its
police power, and since the Court also has recognized that it would be
proper for Congress to enact quarantine legislation,28 it is submitted that
there probably would not be a constitutional bar to the ena'ctment of such
legislation. Apparently, the authority which the Congress has exercised in
enacting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. 264 is the authority "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... ." and
"to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing Powers and all other powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government .... 29
There has been no direct confrontation before the Supreme Court re-
garding Congressional exercise of the quarantine authority and the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures" (4th Amendment); the right
not to "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law" (5th Amendment); and the proscription that "neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction" (13th Amendment).
The Supreme Court has heretofore held constitutional various state
quarantine provisions that deal with an actual communicable disease,
2 8See, therefore, Compagnie Francaise v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380
(1902), and Morgan Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886); see
also Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
29U.S. CONST. Article 1, sec. 8.
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while any proposed quarantine legislation for back contamination would
not; there would be only speculation-a possibility-that contaminated
materials carry communicable diseases or may otherwise endanger Earth's
biosphere. Bearing this distinction in mind, the issues arise whether (i)
seizure pursuant to future legislation would be unreasonable and therefore
in conflict with the 4th Amendment; (2) the permitted seizure, examination,
decontamination and detention of contaminated persons or property would
be an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable act with no reasonable rela-
tion to a legitimate legislative purpose and, therefore, prohibited by the 5th
Amendment; (3) procedures invoked in the quarantine are not suitable and
proper, and thus do not meet the procedural due-process requirement of
the 5th Amendment; and (4) whether the quarantine of contaminated
persons results in an involuntary servitude prohibited by the 13th Amend-
ment.
Responding to the question whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary to
seize and otherwise deprive contaminated persons of liberty or to deprive
persons of contaminated property by quarantine, it is submitted that no
reasonable person could contend at this time that Earth's immediate
ecosystem is immune from the danger of extraterrestrial contaminants.
Precisely because the danger of contamination to Earth's biosphere is
unknown, and because the possibility exists that extraterrestrial bodies
may harbor communicable diseases unknown to man, it is persuasively
reasonable to permit quarantine in this sui generis situation. Therefore,
since the 4th and 5th Amendments proscribe unreasonable seizures3" and
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable acts with no reasonable relation to a
legitimate legislative purpose,31 it is submitted that proper quarantine legis-
lation oriented toward extraterrestrially contaminated persons and objects,
etc., would not violate the U.S. Constitution.
If what is required by the procedural due process aspect of the 5th
Amendment is "that kind of procedure ... which is suitable and proper to
the nature of the case, and sanctioned by the established customs and
usages of the courts," 32 then this requirement may be met by specific and
carefully drawn legislation. In brief, the procedure envisioned would be an
administrative determination based on probable cause that the person or
material had been contaminated. This determination undoubtedly would be
reviewable on application for a writ of habeas corpus, though the quaran-
"
0Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 149 (1925).
31Boylan v. United States, 310 F.2d 493, at 498-499 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 372
U.S. 935 (1963); see also Compagnie Francaise, supra n. 28, at p. 393.32Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, at 289 (1883); see also, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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tined person would not be permitted to appear before the Court.3 3
If, then, a person is deprived of liberty or property with due process of
law, it appears that legislation could not be successfully contested on the
ground that the quarantined person is thus required to perform an in-
voluntary servitude which is proscribed by the 13th Amendment; or that
property was unreasonably seized in violation of the 4th Amendment. The
argument would be specious. Insofar as a person's liberty is taken from
him, it would be done with due process of law in accordance with the 5th
Amendment; and insofar as the 13th Amendment proscribes involuntary
servitude, no enforced compulsory service or labor would be required
under such new legislation.
It is seen, finally, that although proper and sufficient legislative authority
does not exist at present to justify the back contamination quarantine
regulations, there is no real obstacle, constitutional or otherwise, to enact-
ment of new quarantine legislation by the Congress to accommodate the
sui generis situation of contamination of Earth's biosphere by extra-
terrestrial matter.
D. Proposed Legislation for the Clarification of
Extraterrestrial Exposure Quarantine Authority
NASA's back contamination quarantine regulations have been exposed
as lacking adequate legislative authority, even for domestic appli-
cation-either from a single source or from cumulative sources. This does
not mean, however, that formulation of adequate legislation would be
either improper or difficult. Common sense and the Outer Space Treaty
dictate that responsible measures with appropriate safeguards should be
adopted to protect Earth, and therefore the United States, from potential
adverse effects of contamination resulting from both manned and un-
manned space activities involving "extraterrestrial exposure." Toward this
end, the proposed legislation, set forth below and discussed in a sec-
tion-by-section analysis, would provide the Administrator of NASA with
authority to promulgate and enforce necessary back contamination stan-
dards and attendant quarantine regulations with the advice and consent of
the Interagency Committee on Back Contamination and the approval of
the President.
The legislation would authorize the President to direct any Federal
department, agency, or instrumentality of the Executive branch to provide
appropriate and available assistance, upon request, to NASA in executing
33See 28 U.S.C. 2241 et seq. for provisions dealing with the writ of habeas corpus. See
also, United States v. Shinnick, 219 F.Supp. 789 (E.D. N.Y. 1963).
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and enforcing the standards and regulations promulgated pursuant to the
legislation. Further, it would provide the President with authority to imple-
ment more effectively Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, i.e., to nego-
tiate bilateral and multilateral agreements for requesting and accepting the
assistance of, or the rendering of assistance to, any State, possession,
commonwealth, territory, the District of Columbia, foreign government, or
international organization, in the implementation of domestic or foreign
quarantine standards and procedures.
Since (1) there is no express statutory authority upon which NASA may
rely to enforce its agreements with astronauts, personnel and contractor
employees who may be exposed to extraterrestrial contamination, 34 and (2)
there are no guidelines for Executive implementation of quarantine proce-
dures which could be applied extraterritorially to non-U.S. citizens and
property, the need for comprehensive legislation is imperative. It should be
recognized that regardless. of the procedural and physical security mea-
sures undertaken by NASA to confine back contamination to NASA
astronauts, employees and others under contract, there are easily fore-
seeable situations in which unauthorized persons, intentionally or in-
advertently, may be exposed to extraterrestrial contaminants. Further,
there is always the problem of a foreign citizen being exposed to a "spill,"
or some other form of extraterrestrial contamination, thereby providing a
"leak" in the safeguard procedures through the inapplicability of quaran-
tine requirements.
In all of these and similar hypothetical instances, the serious issue exists
whether, in the absence of self-evident harmful effects to Earth's ecosys-
tem by extraterrestrial exposure, a person or thing can be quarantined
against his will or the will of the owner. The proposed legislation, set forth
below, is designed to mitigate the acuteness of the issue by providing the
authority necessary for NASA's Administrator and the President to deal
with these situations in a reasonable manner, both domestically and within
the context of present international political realities.
Draft Legislation and Sectional Analysis
The proposed bill reads as follows:
A BILL
To amend the National. Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as
amended, to protect the United States and Earth from harmful con-
tamination and adverse changes in the environment resulting from the
34See NASA/MSC Form 84/May 1969 (OT)/, Application and Crew Participant Quar-
antine Agreement.
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introduction of extraterrestrially-exposed persons and matter, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That section 103 of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2452) is
amended by adding at the end of the following three subsections:
103(3) The terms "Administration" and "Administrator" mean, respec-
tively, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Ad-
ministrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or his
authorized representative.
103(4) The "Interagency Committee on Back Contamination" (ICBC)
means that Committee established under the auspices of the National
Academy of Sciences, effective August 24, 1967, consisting of one voting
representative each from the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Depart-
ment of the Interior, the National Academy of Sciences, the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State, who
shall be permanent members, and any other instrumentality of the Execu-
tive branch that the President determines is essential to the full consid-
eration, and promulgation, of back contamination standards and quaran-
tine regulations. The ICBC also shall consist of one non-voting represen-
tative each from the Committee on Space Research and the World Health
Organization, expert organizations of the United Nations, and one
non-voting representative from any other international organization which
the President determines is essential to the deliberations of the ICBC. All
such non-voting representatives shall participate directly in consulting
capacities for all business of the ICBC, except in those matters which the
representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
the Department of State jointly determine, in consultation with the Depart-
ment of Defense, are of a classified nature.
103(5) The term "extraterrestrially contaminated" means the state or
condition of any person, property, animal or other form of life or matter
whatsoever, who or which has been exposed:
(a) directly to the surface of the moon or of any other celestial
body without having a predetermined acceptable level of protective
clothing or shielding; or
(b) directly to any non-Earth atmospheric or outer-space environ-
ment which the ICBC determines scientifically, or through predictive
models, is likely to bring any person, property, animal or other form
of life or matter whatsoever into contact with known alien etiologic
agents or which will surpass a probability level of direct contact as
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established by the ICBC in consultation with international orga-
nizations; or
(c) directly or indirectly to any person, property, animal or other
form of life or matter whatsoever who or which is extra terrestrially
contaminated according to subsections 103(5)(a) and 103(5)(b), im-
mediately preceding.
103(6) "United States" means, for purposes only of subsections
203(b)(2) through 203(b)(10), inclusive, the States, the District of Colum-
bia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands, and any other territory or possession of the United States, and all
other airspace, waters, or land subject to total de facto control of the
United States as established by the ICBC, and which are located outside
the United States, as defined herein, for the duration of recovery phases of
specified space missions.
103(7) "Quarantine" means the detention of any person, property, ani-
mal or any other life form or matter whatsoever, or the geographic isola-
tion of any land, water and airspace as defined in section 103(6), herein,
for such time and in such reasonable manner as may be determined to be
necessary by NASA, as published in the form of regulations and promul-
gated pursuant to the public rule-making provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946, as amended, upon the advice of the ICBC and with
the approval of the President.
ANALYSIS
It is not essential that the quarantine authority be implemented through
amendment of existing legislation, i.e., the Space Act of 1958. Quite
legitimately, and perhaps with more drafting ease, the authority could be
established in the form of a separate Act. However, for present purposes,
amendment of the Space Act is both logical and helpful, since (1) quaran-
tine regulations and procedures will, of necessity and for the present, be
parochial in scope, and (2) in the absence of total international participation
in the promulgation of back contamination standards and quarantine proce-
dures, and in view of total NASA control over all U.S. civilian space
missions which have complete operational integration with available quar-
antine facilities, the logical location for quarantine legislation delineating
the Administrator's responsibilities and authority is in the Space Act of
1958. With increasing, substantive international participation, it may well
be that a separate Act would be necessary, placing both policy and oper-
ational authority in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
and/or the Department of Agriculture. Another likely alternative would be
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an independent bureau or agency which also could interface with the World
Health Organization as that entity becomes more a participant in the back
contamination standards and quarantine rulemaking procedures.
The new definitions under section 103 are very important since they are,
in part, the mechanisms upon which back contamination standards and
quarantine regulations are opened for public scrutiny and substantive par-
ticipation. Subsection 103(3) is simply pro forma, since the definitions of
"Administration" and "Administrator" do not appear in the Space Act of
1958, as amended. However, subsection 103(4) defines the ICBC and
provides for international participation, albeit with no voting rights and
subject to essential, but minimal, control over information determined by
NASA and the Department of State, in consultation with (not consent of)
the Department of Defense, to be classified in nature.
Subsection 103(5) defines the operative term "extraterrestrially con-
taminated." This definition differs from that in the existing regulations in
two principal ways. The first is exemption from application of the regu-
lations of anyone or thing coming in direct contact with the surface of a
non-Earth celestial body which is adequately (i.e., completely) insulated. In
the context of present space mission technology, this change, for the most
part, is clarifying in nature. The second principal difference is extension of
contamination coverage to outer space and to non-Earth atmospheric envi-
ronments which the ICBC determines will cause contact with alien etio-
logic agents or which will surpass an established probability level of direct
contact. Further, by definition, the ICBC would assume both planning and
operational roles, rather than one which is designed simply for providing
advice and giving approval on a "before-the-fact" basis. Concisely, as
elaborated upon in subsequent sections, the purpose is to' remove back
contamination problems from final consideration by NASA, alone, and
place them with at least a quasi-independent entity that has the direct
benefit of international, as well as domestic, public expertise.
Subsection 103(6) includes in the definition of "United States" non-
sovereign territory, water, and airspace, the control of which the ICBC
determines is essential to implement back contamination standards and
quarantine procedures for a specific mission. Subsection 103(7) simply
defines "quarantine" and constrains promulgation of quarantine require-
ments to (1) publication as regulations pursuant to public rule-making
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, (2) advice of the ICBC,
and (3) approval of such requirements by the President. The latter con-
straint arises principally from the uniqueness of quarantine procedures to
accommodate extraterrestrial exposure, i.e., the absence of knowledge
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about, or the existence of, Earth-alien pathogens and nonliving matter
which could provide a setting for easy abuse of the quarantine concept.
SEC. 2
Subsection 203(b) is amended by inserting, after subsection 203(b)(1),
the new provisions set forth below, and renumbering existing subsections
203(b)(2) through 203(b)(14) as 203(b)(I 1) through 203(b)(2 1).
203(b)(2). The Administrator, with the advice of the ICBC and approval
of the President, is authorized to promulgate and enforce (with specific due
regard for 5 U.S.C. 553-558, inclusive, and applicable international law)
those quarantine regulations as are necessary to protect the United States
and Earth from harmful effects resulting from exposure to any extra-
terrestrially contaminated person, property, animal or other form of life or
matter whatsoever. In emergency situations in which it is impractical to
seek advice of the ICBC, the Administrator may, with the approval of the
President, apply quarantine procedures which in his judgment are neces-
sary to ensure protection of the United States and Earth, consistent with
international law. Under no circumstances will the emergency quarantine
procedures apply beyond ten consecutive days without review and approv-
al by the ICBC.
ANALYSIS
Of primary importance in subsection 203(b)(2) are (1) the requirement to
promulgate regulations in accordance with the spirit and intent of the
Administrative Procedure Act (timely publication and procedures for pub-
lic participation in rule making, i.e., 5 U.S.C. 553 through 558), and (2) the
provision for application of quarantine procedures which have not been
subject to APA requirements because of an emergency situation. In recog-
nition of the fortuitiveness of such emergencies and the possible need for a
relatively time-critical decision, the advice of the ICBC is not required.
However, Presidential approval is mandatory, principally on the assump-
tion that his deliberations would not be as time-consuming as those of the
ICBC, and also on the assumption that the President's personal review and
approval would minimize the possibility of abuse of the emergency quaran-
tine authority.
It should be noted, also, that implementation of all quarantine regu-
lations must be consistent with international law. This would not only
prohibit implementation of such regulations in those non-sovereign areas,
and under those circumstances, which customary or treaty law has deter-
mined inappropriate for unilateral application of sovereign jurisdiction, but
also would permit-perhaps encourage-bilateral and multilateral arrange-
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ments to facilitate, throughout the political world, the safeguarding of Earth
from adverse effects of extraterrestrial contaminants. This requirement also
constrains appropriately the definition given under proposed subsection
103(6) for the "United States." In any event, it would necessitate a closer
view of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty by the United States as a
Contracting Party to determine precisely how much international participa-
tion is required by that Treaty in the formulation of back contamination
standards and quarantine procedures for U.S. (or U.S.-involved) space
missions.
Finally, under no circumstances will emergency quarantine procedures
be applied beyond a period of ten days without the ICBC's review and
approval. This provision is consistent with the more cautious, and perhaps
more realistic, regulatory authority deriving from a few State legislatures as
a means of accommodating those situations in which Constitutional guar-
antees must, of necessity, be compromised.
SEC. 3
203(b)(3). The Interagency Committee is hereby authorized to select a
competent staff of experts necessary to execute the duties and respon-
sibilities of the Committee. There are authorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary to carry out the provision of this subsection.
ANALYSIS
This subsection is self-explanatory, providing both for ICBC staffing and
the necessary attendant appropriations.
SEC. 4
203(b)(4). The rules and regulations issued pursuant to subsection
203(b)(2) may provide for:
(i) the apprehension, physical examination, detention, quarantine
or conditional release of any person determined by the Administrator
or his authorized representative to be extraterrestrially exposed or
contaminated. Such person, in accordance with the authority granted
in subsection 203(b)(2), may be detained or quarantined in a manner
determined reasonably necessary in view of the known or unknown
contaminants. Such detention or quarantine shall not exceed thirty
consecutive calendar days calculated from the last known date on
which a person, property, animal or any other form of life or matter
whatsoever, was contaminated; provided that if the extra-
terrestrially-contaminated person suffers from a condition resulting
from such contamination, and which the President determines would
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be harmful to the United States or Earth if such person were released
from quarantine, then the President shall direct, by Executive order,
that quarantine be continued until such time and in such reasonable
manner as may be necessary. This provision in no way affects subsec-
tion 203(b)(2) as it relates to emergency situations in which review
and approval of the quarantine by the ICBC is necessary to extend
such quarantine beyond ten consecutive days.
(ii) except with respect to persons, the seizure, inspection, quaran-
tine, fumigation, disinfection, sterilization and destruction of prop-
erty, animals or other form of life or matter whatsoever in any
situation in which the Administrator or his authorized representatives
determine that there is probable cause to believe that such form of
life or matter is extra terrestrially contaminated;
(iii) quarantine facilities, essential grounds and anchorages within
the United States, and at any point outside the United States as
defined in subsection 103(6) which the President, through bilateral
agreements, or multilateral treaty arrangements with the advice and
consent of the Congress, may so designate;
(iv) the quarantine, in a reasonable manner, and with the advice of
the ICBC and approval of the President, of any area of the United
States, or anywhere on Earth if consistent with international law,
when there is good and sufficient cause to believe that such area is
extraterrestrially contaminated; and
(v) the holding of hearings, by the Administrator with or without
participation of the ICBC, at times and in a manner he determines
desirable and necessary to assist in the execution of his duties, and
for the purpose of creating a record for use in making any determina-
tion pursuant to subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(9), inclusive, or for
the purpose of reviewing any such determination.
ANALYSIS
The nature of subsection 203(b)(4) is permissive, providing examples of
the types of rules and regulations that may be promulgated and enforced
consistent with the authority which would be granted by the proposed
amendments. Such rules and regulations are largely self-explanatory and, in
part, are somewhat analogous to authority legislated for the Secretaries of
Health, Education and Welfare, and of the Department of Agriculture. 35
Except in emergency situations, the duration of quarantine shall extend
to, but not exceed, thirty consecutive days from the last date of extra-
terrestrial exposure. Those persons or objects, etc., indirectly exposed
need only be watched for the remainder of the isolation period for those
a5See 7 U.S. 150dd, 160-161 and 164a; 20 U.S.C. et seq; and 42 U.S.C. 264 and 67(a).
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contaminated or directly exposed, except when exceptional circumstances
are known to exist. The period of thirty days is now altogether arbitrary. It
allows a reasonable time, beyond the normal 2 1-day incubation period for
most Earth-indigenous microbial diseases known to reach epidemic propor-
tions, to accommodate potential extraterrestriai micro-organisms or matter
which might manifest latent adverse effects. Presumably, such adverse
effects are likely to become evident within a period of thirty consecutive
days. If it is determined during or at the end of thirty days that the
contamination is harmful and classifiable by the Department of Agriculture
and/or of Health, Education and Welfare as a communicable disease, then
those Executive Departments may, of course, invoke their own respective
quarantine authorities and continue the detention in the manner, and for
the duration, prescribed by their rules and regulations. However, if the
harmful effects continue and the etiology cannot be determined to be
communicable in nature, then the President may, by Executive order,
continue the quarantine for such time and in such manner as may reason-
ably be necessary to ensure the safety of the United States and of Earth
against a premature release of the contaminated subject.
The President is also authorized, by subsections 203(b)(4)(iii) and (iv), to
make formal and informal arrangements to facilitate an effective back
contamination program world-wide. These provisions, by their permissive
nature, would provide encouragement to the Executive branch to seek
international agreements for implementing a broadly applicable back con-
tamination program (within the recognized constraints of classified in-
formation and national security of all countries which might participate), in
order to confine the risk and spread of back contamination as much as
possible.
SEC. 5
203(b)(5). The Administrator may administer oaths and affirmations;
take, or have taken, depositions; and require, on his own motion and by
subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses, as well as the pro-
duction of documentary evidence relating to any matter pending before
him under the authority of subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8). In the event of
contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena, any district court of the United
States within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or
refusal to obey is found or resides or is domiciled or transacts business,
upon application of the Attorney General, shall have jurisdiction to issue
to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Admin-
istrator, there to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or there to
give testimony touching the matter under investigation; and any failure to
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obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt
thereof.
ANALYSIS
For the most part, this subsection follows the pattern of 42 U.S.C. Supp.
IV 1973g(c), and 5 U.S.C. Supp. IV 304, 556(c), which respectively (1)
provides for the subpoena power of the Civil Service Commission and a
contempt penalty for contumacy and refusal, and (2) describes the sub-
poena power and procedures therefor, of heads of an Executive depart-
ment, military department, or bureau thereof, and also delineates powers of
employees-subject to published rules and regulations-in conducting a
hearing of record.
Exercise of authority granted in this subsection may be essential, for
example, in the determination as to whether a person, animal or thing has
been extraterrestrially contaminated, either directly or indirectly on a suc-
cessive basis pursuant to the definition of "extraterrestrial contamination."
Further, authority is provided through these procedures for the Adminis-
trator to determine where the alleged contaminee is located. Finally, the
Administrator is authorized at his discretion to hold hearings of record as
to any matter property within his sole responsibility in accordance with
subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8).
SEC. 6
203(b)(6). The Administrator shall employ a staff of quarantine in-
spectors who shall be expert in the area of extraterrestrial contamination
and attendant quarantine procedures. The membership of the staff shall be
subject to the review and approval of the United States Public Health
Officer. Any properly-identified quarantine inspector is authorized, when so
directed by the Administrator: (i) to stop and inspect, without a warrant,
any person, property, animal or other form of life or matter whatsoever,
moving into the United States (as defined in subsection 103(b) herein) or
in interstate commerce, in order to determine whether he or it is extra-
terrestrially contaminated. The quarantine inspector must have adequate
reason and sufficient cause to believe that the person, property, etc.,
stopped and inspected is likely to be extraterrestrially contaminated; and
(ii) to enter, with a warrant, any premise in the United States (as defined in
subsection 103(b), herein) and to conduct any inspections and make any
seizures necessary pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated accord-
ing to the authority provided in subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8) inclusive.
Any judge of the United States or a court of record of any state, or of any
commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, or a United
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States Commissioner or magistrate, within his respective jurisdiction and
upon proper oath or affirmation showing probable cause to believe that
there is on certain premises an extraterrestrially-contaminated person,
property, animal or other form of life or matter whatsoever, may issue
warrants for the entry of such premises to make any inspections or seizures
provided for by the rules and regulations promulgated according to subsec-
tions 203(b)(2)-203(b)(7) inclusive. Such warrants may be executed by any
authorized employee of the Administration.
ANALYSIS
This subsection is clear and self-explanatory, and closely follows, for the
most part, 7 U.S.C. 150ff and 164a, which provide, respectively, for
inspections, seizures and the issue of warrants regarding quarantine author-
ity and procedures of the Department of Agriculture, and for interception,
without a warrant and under specified conditions, of certain plants moving
into the United States or in interstate commerce. Reference to magistrates
is an accommodation of 28 U.S.C. Supp. IV 636, which provides, in part,
that "[elach United States magistrate [appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Supp. IV 631] .... shall have within the territorial jurisdiction prescribed
by his appointment.., such additional duties as are not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States."
SEC. 7
203(b)(7). The President is authorized to direct any Federal agency or
department in the Executive branch to assist the Administration, through
the use of its personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities and other available
resources which may be appropriate, in the execution of the quaran-
tine-related authority, rules and regulations deriving from subsections
203(b)(2)-203(b)(7). The President may also direct that such assistance be
made available, upon appropriate request and in such manner as may be
agreed, to countries with which the United States has agreements or treaty
arrangements covering the facilitation of a mutually-agreed international
extraterrestrial back contamination and quarantine program. In either
situation, when a Federal agency or department is so directed, the Admin-
istrator may invest the necessary employees of such agency or department
with the same authority and concomitant protection provided in subsec-
tions 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8), or rules and regulations issued pursuant there-
to, that may be invested in employees of the Administration. Such services,
personnel, facilities, and equipment may be made available on a reim-
bursable basis. Any funds received by Federal agencies as reimbursement
for use of its personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities and other available
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resources shall be deposited to the credit of the appropriation or appro-
priations currently available therefor. Any appropriations presently avail-
able, or that will be made available, to the Administration for back con-
tamination control shall be used as necessary to assist in defraying the
expenses of enforcing the quarantine rules, regulations, and other author-
ity provided for in subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8), inclusive.
ANALYSIS
This subsection is patterned, in part, on 42 U.S.C. 2473a(6), which
provides that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall
"use, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel and facilities
of Federal and other agencies with or without reimbursement ..... " Such
Federal and other agencies are directed to cooperate fully with the Admin-
istration in making such services, equipment, personnel and facilities avail-
able. The subsection is supported further by 31 U.S.C. 686 which deals
with expenditures for telegraph and telephone communication. Other legis-
lation serving both as a pattern and as supporting authority for this subsec-
tion are 42 U.S.C. 243, by which it is provided that the U.S. Surgeon
General may accept or render any necessary and available assistance from
and to State and local authorities in the enforcement of quarantine regu-
lations issued pursuant to subchapter II of Chapter 6A of 42 U.S.C., and
50 U.S.C. 2292, which provide that Federal agencies and departments, at
the direction of the President and under specified emergency conditions,
shall assist states in confronting such conditions. Existing subsection
203(b)(6) of the Space Act of 1958 provides for such loans and services
among private and governmental entities, but it was decided that for pur-
poses of quarantine authority a separate provision should be proposed
because of the pervasive nature of the back contamination program and
quarantine procedures.
With respect to the provision for NASA and other Federal agencies and
departments, at the direction of the President, to render assistance to, and
accept it from, foreign countries in furtherance of the extraterrestrial quar-
antine authority, additional supporting authority may be found in the
existing Space Act of 1958. Subsection 102(c)(7) [42 U.S.C. 245 l(c)(7)],
provides that "aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall
be conducted so as to contribute materially to...
(7) Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations
in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the
results thereof....
Further, section 205 provides that
[tihe Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the President, i.e.,
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Department of State, may engage in a program of international cooperation in
work done pursuant to this Act, and in the peaceful application of the results
thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate."
SEC. 8
203(b)(8). Any person who violates any rule or regulation issued pur-
suant to authorization in subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(7), inclusive, or
who enters or departs the limits of any quarantine station, ground or
anchorage in disregard of quarantine rules and regulations, or without
permission of the quarantine inspector, officer or other proper official in
charge, or who violates any of the rules or regulations deriving from an
international agreement dealing with quarantine of extra-
terrestrially-contaminated objects, persons or other life forms for which an
appropriate sanction is not otherwise provided, shall be subject to a fine of
not more than $5,000, or to imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both.
ANALYSIS
This subsection is self-explanatory and patterned largely on 18 U.S.C.
799 [Sec. 304(c) of the Space Act of 1958], which provides that violation
of any regulation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
shall be a misdemeanor punishable as such.
SEC. 9
203(b)(9).
a. Any claim for money damages against the United States arising out of
an act or omission of any Government employee or agent while acting
within the scope of his employment, office or agency, pursuant to subsec-
tions 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8), or the rules and regulations deriving therefrom,
shall be governed by, and disposed of in accordance with, the provisions of
Chapter 171 of Title 28, and subsection 2473(b)(13) of Title 42, except
that:
(i) for the purposes of subsections 1346(b), 2672, and 2675 of Title
28, any injury or loss of property or personal injury or death sus-
tained as a result of the enforcement, operation or execution of the
authority provided in subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8) herein, or the
rules or regulations deriving therefrom, which has been caused by an
act or omission of an employee or agent of the Government acting
within the scope of his employment, office or agency, shall be deemed
to have been caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
an employee or agent of the Government;
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(ii) Subsection 1346(b) and Chapter 171 of Title 28, and subsec-
tion 2473(b)(13) of Title 42, shall apply to claims for money damages
arising from actions or conduct pursuant to subsections
203(b)(2)-203(b)(8) herein, and which are described in subsections
2680(a) and (f) of Title 28, or which arise out of false imprisonment
as described in subsection 2680(h) of Title 28; and
(iii) in determining solely the circumstances in which the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accor-
dance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,
this subsection 203(b)(9) a(i) and a(ii) shall not be applicable.
b. The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b),
2672, and 2675 of Title 28 and section 2473(b)(13) of Title 42, for
damages for any injury or loss of property or personal injury or death,
arising out of an act or omission of any Government employee or agent
while acting within the scope of his employment, office or agency pursuant
to subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8) herein, or rules or regulations deriving
therefrom, shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by
reason of the same subject matter against such employee or agent whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim.
c. Subsection 203(b)(9)a. above, shall not be applicable to any claim for
money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death
arising out of a willful violation of any rule or regulation issued pursuant to
subsections 203(b)(2)-203(b)(8), herein.
ANALYSIS
Subsection 203(b)(9)a. is based on the Federal Tort Claims Act (28
U.S.C., Chap. 171) and the NASA provision for administrative settlement
ot claims [42 U.S.C. 2473(b)(13)], as the devices for compensating persons
for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death sustained as a
result of the enforcement and execution of the quarantine authority pro-
vided by the bill. Three exceptions are made to the provisions of the
Federal Tort Claims Act and the NASA settlement provision. In para-
graph 203(b)(9)a.i. provision is made for the conclusive presumption that if
harm results from an act or omission of a Government employee or agent
(the latter of which is intended to accommodate those persons directed by
the President to render assistance and services in furtherance of the objec-
tives of the quarantine authority) while acting within the scope of his
employment, office or agency pursuant to the authority provided by the
bill, or the rules and regulations deriving from such authority, the harm
shall be deemed to have been caused by the wrongful or negligent act or
omission of the employee or agent acting within the scope of his employ-
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ment and authority. On the other hand, this does not necessarily mean that
the person harmed will have a cause of action under the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred; nor does it prevent the Government
from raising the defense that the employee or agent was not acting within
the scope of his employment, office or agency, or that an exception pro-
vided in 28 U.S.C. 2680 is applicable.
As an alternative approach to subsection 203(b)(9)a., a provision could
be drafted providing for a form of administratively-determined com-
pensation or indemnification based on 10 U.S.C. 2354, 21 U.S.C. 134a(d),
38 U.S.C. 216, 42 U.S.C. 2210 and E.O. 10789, 14 Nov. 1958, as
amended, which implement 50 U.S.C. 1431.36
In paragraph 203(b)(9)a.ii., four defenses, whether considered jurisdic-
tional in nature or not and normally available to the Government, are
eliminated [i.e., the two defenses available in 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), generally
referred to as the discretionary fund, the defense in 28 U.S.C. 2680(f),
which is the quarantine exception, and the defense in 28 U.S.C. 2680(h)
that deals with claims arising out of false imprisonment]. The remaining
exceptions in 28 U.S.C. 2680(h) would be applicable to actions brought
under the authority proposed in this bill, as well as under the rules and
regulations deriving from that authority. The net effect of subsection
203(b)(9)a.ii. would be the availability of an action brought by a person for
compensation, if, for example, the harm is caused by a Government em-
ployee or agent who exercises due care in the execution of his respon-
sibilities pursuant to the authority granted; or if the harm is caused by the
exercise or performance, or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty; or if the harm arises directly from the imposition or
establishment of a quarantine by the United States; or if such harm is the
consequency of false imprisonment.
Paragraph 203(b)(9)a.iii. is designed to accomplish several purposes.
First, it is intended to ensure that no argument will be made that the
United States, considered as a private person, would be privileged or
otherwise immune from liability because a statute (i.e., the authority which
would be granted in the proposed amendments) required that the "private
person" act or fail to act, thereby causing the damage which serves as the
basis of a complaint. Concisely, it strikes any vestige of law which would
immunize or make privileged an act performed by a private person in the
execution of a law. Second, this provision would supplement the con-
clusive presumption, set forth in subsection 203(b)(9)a.i., that the act or
omission causing damage is deemed a wrongful act or omission. This wbuld
361n this respect, see also Frankel, Preventative Restraints and Just Compensation:
Toward a Sanction Law of the Future, 78 YALE L.J. 229, 256 (1968).
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be accomplished by use of a fiction that the exceptions were not in force
and could not be relied upon by the Government employee or agent whose
act or omission caused the damage. Third, this provision would ensure that
the United States is not designated improperly as the "good samaritan" by
virtue of the proposed amendments, i.e., one who has volunterred to be
conclusively liable for protecting the public from the danger of extra-
terrestrial contamination. Finally, section 203(b)(9)a. is in no manner in-
tended to preclude actions for compensation against the United States that
may be brought under other law; for example, 28 U.S.C. 1491.
Subsection 203(b)(9)b. renders the remedy provided in subsection
203(b)(9)a. against the United States exclusive, so that no Government
employee or agent acting within the scope of his employment or office
pursuant to the proposed amendment, or rules and regulations deriving
therefrom, would be liable personally for the consequences of an act or
omission.
Subsection 203(b)(9)c. provides that if any injury, loss, or death arises
from a willful violation (i.e., an act or omission where the person respon-
sible or his principal knew that such an act or omission was a violation) of
any rule or regulation deriving from these amendments, the remedy in
subsection 203(b)(9)a. would not be available to him or his successors in
interest.
SEC. 10
203(b)(10). Any determination made under the authority of subsections
203(b)(2)-203(b)(8), inclusive, or any rule or regulation deriving there-
from that results or will result in the detention or quarantine of a specific
person or property, shall be reviewable, as appropriate, on application for
a writ of habeas corpus as provided in Chapter 38 of Title 28, United
States Code, or on application to a proper Federal court for injunctive
relief. Any other provision of law notwithstanding, the body of the person
or the property which has been detained or quarantined shall not be
required to be produced at an attendant hearing, nor shall it be discharged
from detention or quarantine pending the court's final order or judgment;
nor shall it be discharged pending a review of that order or judgment.
ANALYSIS
In this subsection the fact is made explicit that any determination to
detain or quarantine a specific person or property as being suspected of
extraterrestrial contamination, may be reviewed on application for a writ of
habeas corpus or for injunctive relief. With respect to a writ of habeas
corpus, this subsection would, of necessity, qualify the procedure by ensur-
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ing that the person or property would not be discharged on recognizance,
bail, bond, etc., pending a final order or judgment, or pending a review of
that order or judgment on appeal. Further, injunctive relief would be
constrained to selective conduct or restraints on the part of the Govern-
ment- in the absence of an adequate showing that detention or quarantine
is justified-to ensure a continuing effectiveness of quarantine procedures
being applied.
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